Introduction
Transnational human rights networks are a form of cross-border collective action created to promote compliance with universally accepted norms. Transnational networks against slavery and for women's suffrage existed well before the creation of the United Nations in 1945 (Rabben 2002) , but sustained scholarly attention to principled transnational activism only emerged decades after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) and the creation of a new type of information-driven and impartial transnational activism, embodied in organizations such as Amnesty International (AI, founded in 1961) and Human Rights Watch (HRW, founded in 1978) . (Keck and Sikkink 1998) , Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink established a new field of interdisciplinary research on the significance and challenges of principled transnational organizing. Unabashedly optimistic about the power of norms and networks, this literature focused initially on the ability of transnational and domestic activists to challenge governments and their repressive practices "from above and below" (Brysk 1993) . Unlike earlier attempts at establishing a transnationalist research agenda (Keohane and Nye 1971) , the new scholarship benefited from the simultaneous rise of the constructivist paradigm. The emergence of transnational advocacy networks and their initial scholarly reception will be discussed in the first main section, titled "Explaining the Power of Transnational Human Rights Networks." The focus is on efforts to explain how transnational human rights networks successfully intervene in domestic politics.
With Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics
Scholarly challenges based on materialist and utilitarian views of international politics emerged quickly and accused the advocacy literature of exclusively focusing on cases of successful norm adoption (Bae 2007) as well as norms promoted by 2 progressive sections of global civil society (Price 2003) . Some argue that unelected transnational activists impose their progressive agenda on the world (Anderson 2000) , while others diagnose the co-optation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and a loss of the "emancipatory potentials of global civil society" (Jaeger 2007) . Scholars critically reviewing examples of transnational advocacy campaigns identified a number of problems, including (1) the difficulties of establishing and sustaining transnational networks (Tarrow 2005) ; (2) the inability of human rights activists to recognize violations (Carpenter 2007) as well as systemic biases in selecting targets based on expected media exposure rather than principles and need (Ron et al. 2005) ; (3) the difficulties of domestic social movements in attracting international support (Bob 2005) or subsequent local resistance against such interventions (Hertel 2006) ; and (4) unintended negative consequences of transnational mobilization on the domestic level (Schmitz 2006; Kuperman 2008) . The second main section, titled "Transnational and Local Activism: Failed Promises, Unintended Consequences, and the Difficult Politics of Representation," will review those arguments and discuss in what ways transnational activism represents a particularly challenging form of social mobilization.
While the first two sections of the main part of the essay primarily describe an academic debate on the significance and motives of transnational human rights networks, the third section , titled "Extending Transnational Advocacy beyond the State," will take more account of the way in which the transnational advocacy sector itself has evolved over the past decade. The failure to prevent and end major atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as well as more visible challenges to the dominant Western view of human rights contributed to a sense of crisis among activists (Rieff 1999) well before state governments' responses to the "war on terrorism" reversed progress on basic civil liberties. In response to new and diverse challenges for human rights defenders, the mainstream of transnational human rights networks seeks to move away from the reactive model of human rights reporting.
Faced with new (and recurring) challenges to the protection of basic rights, activists
(1) have focused more attention on establishing and strengthening preventive institutions and early warning systems within the United Nations framework, (2) have begun to target more systematically human rights violations committed by non-state actors, and (3) have made efforts to promote previously neglected social and economic rights in broader strategic alliances built around a rights-based understanding of economic development. (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 9) .
Changes in the recent practice of transnational human rights activism were driven by the end of the superpower rivalry in 1989, challenges to the de facto dominance of civil and political rights over social, economic, and cultural rights, and the persistent gap between the global diffusion of rights rhetoric and atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sudan, or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Those human rights crises nurtured a fundamental skepticism about the model of impartial activism (de Waal 1997; Rieff 1999; Leebaw 2007) , leading to public and internal controversies about the mandate and strategies of major human rights groups (Korey 1998: ch. 14; Hopgood 2006) . Others blamed the professionalization and legalization of the movement for its waning popular support (Kennedy 2004; Bell and Coicaud 2007) or charged that human rights and humanitarian groups compromised their principles in favor of economic interests, media exposure, and organizational growth and survival (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Ron et al. 2005 ).
The attacks of September 11, 2001 , and the subsequent military response by the United States government have further highlighted the challenges faced by the global human rights movement. In the short term, the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to internal divisions as some prominent activists advanced visions of a "military humanitarianism" (Chandler 2001) and applauded the violent removal of a heinous dictator. In the long term, the "rogue" policies established by the Bush Administration and followed by many other governments are likely to increase the awareness among 4 human rights activists that fundamental changes to the practice of transnational human rights promotion are inevitable. To remain relevant, transnational human rights networks have to shift away from a primarily reactive mode of "shaming" violators after the fact and develop proactive strategies of education, prevention, and local empowerment.
Scholars can play an important role in contributing to the ongoing shift from reactive to preventive transnational strategies. While the familiar "shaming" efforts remain an important part of moral advocacy, activists have to learn how to give local populations a greater voice in defining the content of campaigns (Ignatieff 2001:10) and in developing strategies of long-term social change, including redirecting and strengthening state capacity to effectively protect and advance human rights. Such a shift towards a more openly political transnational activism is only complete when activists no longer view those they support as "victims" of repression, but as equal partners in a joint struggle for the expansion of rights and freedoms around the world.
Transnational Human Rights Networks: Emergence, Significance, and

Limitations
The main part of this essay is divided into three parts. The first part (Explaining the Power of Transnational Human Rights Networks) will summarize arguments establishing and explaining the principled power of transnational advocacy networks.
The second part (Transnational and Local Activism: Failed Promises, Unintended Consequences, and the Difficult Politics of Representation) will shift attention to scholarly works directly challenging the conventional wisdom established by the principled view of transnational activism. The third and final part (Extending Transnational Advocacy beyond the State) will look beyond the academic debate on how best to capture the motives and strategies of the advocacy sector and discuss some of the ways in which the current practice of transnational activism has changed in response to experiences of successes and failures.
Explaining the Power of Transnational Human Rights Networks
5
Scholarship on transnational human rights networks emerged during the 1990s within the subfield of International Relations and as a challenge to the state-centric and materialist bias of the field. At the same time, a few social movement scholars had also begun to extend their research beyond the domestic and identified transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs) as new subjects of inquiry (Smith 1995) .
Within the field of international relations, earlier works establishing transnationalism as a core challenge to a state-dominated world had set an important precedent (Kaiser 1969; Keohane and Nye 1971; Rosenau 1980; Willetts 1982) , but largely failed to inspire a self-sustaining research agenda on the significance of transnational actors (Orenstein and Schmitz 2006) . A sustained transnational research agenda only emerged after scholars began to describe and analyze a prolonged growth of the transnational NGO sector (Smith et al. 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999; Sikkink and Smith 2001 ) and the emergence of the constructivist paradigm (Hasenclever et al. 1997 ).
Arguing that social reality is constructed through the interactions of individuals and collective actors in a community (of states), proponents of transnational activism claimed that groups advancing specific universal norms such as human rights could shape the behavior of states and governments without having control over significant material resources. If norms are understood as collectively shared understandings of appropriate behavior and their effects can be empirically studied (Barkun 1964) , principled NGOs can elicit compliance with those standards by exposing major instances of violations and mobilizing the entire community against violators. In this view, the external environment of states is primarily cultural (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Finnemore 1996) and norms matter because they define community standards and direct how states define their interests (Hurrell 2002:145) .
While there is no direct link between the assumption of a constructed social reality and the study of norms or transnational activism, scholars studying human rights Activists beyond Borders (Keck and Sikkink 1998) • the growth of international contacts enabled by communication technologies as well as the proliferation of intergovernmental organizations and conferences devoted to human rights causes;
• the presence of political entrepreneurs convinced that transnational networking is a useful tool of activism;
• a government ignoring social and political demands emanating from its own society, thus forcing domestic activists to appeal to international supporters (the boomerang pattern).
The emergence of a global human rights system after 1948 represents here the key development, which established a new opportunity structure for oppressed domestic activists interested in "shifting venues to bring in new allies and activate friendly audiences" (Tarrow 2005:145) .
The key actors within transnational networks are domestic and international NGOs, which collect and disseminate information related to their principled causes. Keck and Sikkink claim that this type of social action is "distinctly different from markets and hierarchy (the firm)," because transnational networks are highly flexible, yet integrated by shared values rather than economic self-interest or obedience to a higher authority (Keck and Sikkink 1998:8) . The core resource of advocacy networks is information, which is usually collected on the local level, transmitted to allies abroad, and then published in reports and testimonies in order to mobilize moral outrage against human rights violations. Advocacy networks use highly symbolic events such as state visits by foreign leaders to gain access to the media and also enlist other, more powerful actors to support their cause and exert additional pressure on the target of a campaign (1998:22-4 (Risse-Kappen 1995) . By focusing on rights-based activism, Keck and Sikkink show how advocacy networks can break into closed societies and have the power to entirely alter domestic politics. In their view, the success of transnational activism is not just determined by target characteristics, but also by the character of the issue and by properties unique to the networks or "sender" of a campaign (1998:203-9) . With regard to issue characteristics, Keck and Sikkink claim that transnational networks and activists are central in creating a common ideational framework that overcomes the international-domestic divide and creates moral interdependence across societies. Unlike trade or environmental issues, human rights violations do not necessarily create externalities for other societies, and significant cultural differences may exist between international norms and domestic belief systems. Hence, Keck and Sikkink argued that not all rights are equally likely to give rise to successful transnational campaigns. Most chances for success had campaigns focusing on "issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, and legal equality of opportunity " (1998:204) .
Activists beyond Borders suggested that the success of transnational campaigns may also be driven by the "density and strength of networks" as well as "the vulnerability [of targets] to both material and moral leverage" (Keck and Sikkink 1998:207) . Surprisingly enough, subsequent scholarship on transnational activism rarely tested in detail the hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of network mobilization developed by Keck and Sikkink. While it is relatively easy to come up with empirical and theoretical challenges to those claims (see below), there is still little progress in (1) clearly defining the properties of those factors, and (2) delineating their relative importance compared to others. Those questions range from straightforward empirical issues, such as the measurement of density of networks, to complex evaluations of cross-cultural differences regarding the concept of bodily can change the domestic practices of governments (Risse et al. 1999; Burgerman 2001; Hawkins 2002; Cardenas 2007; Okafor 2007) . Those studies move beyond Keck and Sikkink's work in two important ways. First, they provide more empirical detail on the transnational/domestic interactions sketched in the boomerang model. Second, the case studies begin to identify some of the conditions that counteract the effectiveness of transnational human rights activism.
Designed as a follow-up study to Activists beyond Borders, the edited volume
The Power of Human Rights (Risse et al. 1999 ) focused on the final stages of the boomerang model and developed a five-step process describing how international pressure can elicit domestic compliance with global norms. In breaking down the process leading from the initial "shaming" of human rights-violating governments to norm compliance, the edited volume used paired country comparisons to describe the interactions between transnational activists, state governments, and local groups as a process of socialization through strategic bargaining and persuasion. The case studies identified common government responses, including the frequent initial denial of such accusations and the use of tactical concessions in order to quiet external critics.
The Power of Human Rights follows Activists beyond Borders in assuming
that human rights change is primarily driven by transnational mobilization rather than domestic structural forces. The edited volume adds evidence on the events unfolding around particular instances of transnational mobilization, but its overall framework shared the optimistic view that international institutions with little enforcement power can use persuasion to move repressive governments from empty promises to compliance. This perspective was driven by the dual misunderstanding that civil and political rights represented the most "basic rights" of the UDHR and that their comparatively higher degree of international institutionalization increases the likelihood of "an impact on human rights practices" (Risse et al. 1999:3) . Both of these assumptions have been strongly challenged by more recent empirical studies on international human rights institutions as well as scholars expressing non-Western perspectives on rights issues.
The case studies contained in The Power of Human Rights offered some initial insights into why human rights change may not be as automatic as many proponents 12 of transnational activism suggested. In the chapter on Indonesia and the Philippines, differences in the definition of nationalism promoted by elites explained variation in the impact of transnational human rights mobilization (Jetschke 1999) . Other studies also used variants of the "domestic structure" argument by explaining differences in the impact of human rights norms based on congruence between international norms and domestic beliefs (Hawkins 2002:6; Bae 2007) Beyond exploring conditions within the target of mobilization, scholars focus on the specific resources and strategies available to transnational activists. Doing so moves beyond viewing advocacy networks primarily as information exchanges and integrates insights from social movement research into explanations of network success and failure (Khagram et al. 2002; Tarrow 2005) . A core contribution of the social movement literature is the claim that "forming transnational movements is not easy" (Tarrow 2005:7) , a claim echoing Roht-Arriaza's view that successful 13 campaigns are the exception and rely on a measure of serendipitous events. Dense interpersonal networks are a condition for successful collective action (Loveman 1998 ) and those networks are much less prevalent across national borders.
Perceived threats to national security represent a core explanation for a lack of human rights progress (Hawkins 2002; Cardenas 2007 ). After 9/11, policies designed to limit terrorist threats added empirical evidence demonstrating how quickly governments with a strong human rights record can revert to systematic violations.
The official use of "enhanced" interrogation techniques by US government agencies against terrorist suspects not only exposes the fragility of human rights in established democracies (Greenberg 2005 ), but it also shows how governments effectively contest the meaning of norms. Increased integration into a world polity sharing human rights norms does not necessarily lead to sustainable human rights improvements, and transnational ties can be weakened by state repression (Wiest 2007 ). Wiest effectively shows in her comparative study of Arab nations simultaneously affected by transnational human rights and Islamic movements how the familiar "boomerang" model of activism fails to lead to positive social and political changes. While countries with a history of political liberalization (e.g. Tunisia and Yemen) fared slightly better than those without such an experience (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Syria), the study reiterates the point that transnational mobilization needs to move beyond reactive "shaming" strategies in order to remain relevant during times of increased government repression caused by terrorist threats.
Far from developing a single theory of transnational activism, the strongest arguments for the power of human rights mobilization are found in case studies that trace interactions between transnational activists, domestic allies, and government agencies. We know today more about the difficulties of sustaining transnational mobilization, the domestic circumstances favoring its emergence, and the many threats leading to failure and reversal. And even when human rights records improve on paper, scholars should be aware that governments may have shifted their repressive practices (Schmitz 2006) , may already have effectively "eliminated their opponents" (Cardenas 2007:13) , or simply return to repression after international media attention disappears again (Schwarz 2004; Evans 2005 ). The section below will shift attention from scholarly works broadly sympathetic to the practice of transnational activism to those fundamentally skeptical about its motives, results, and legitimacy.
Transnational and Local Activism: Failed Promises, Unintended Consequences, and the Difficult Politics of Representation
The influence and staying power of Activists beyond Borders is reflected in a burgeoning literature challenging the book's positive evaluation of transnational advocacy. This section will present studies challenging the core assumptions about the effectiveness of principled human rights activism. The conclusions of these studies range from claims that international support plays no significant role compared to the autonomous efforts of domestic activists (Press 2006) A final argument against transnational activism claims that well-meaning campaigners not only ignore local needs and commit acts of cultural imperialism, but actually contribute to the very violence they seek to end. One variation of this claim focuses on the regular demands to end impunity for gross human rights violations even after a transition to more democratic rule (Snyder and Vinjamuri 2003) .
Transnational activists do not only frequently contribute to the demise of repressive governments, they also regularly call for the establishment of domestic or international tribunals to put on trial those responsible for past atrocities. Impunity campaigns have been a central part of transnational activism and have been a key factor in the rapid diffusion of transitional justice mechanisms during the 1990s (Borneman 1997; Hayner 2001; Roht-Arriaza 2005) , including the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Glasius 2002) . Realist critics of those mechanisms to deal with past abuses argue that leaders are less likely to acquiesce in their loss of power if faced with a tribunal and time in jail. The threat of a trial may contribute to continued violence and undermine the transition to a government supporting the rule of law.
Another variation of the "activism breeds violence" argument claims that domestic groups are more likely to resort to violence if they can expect an intervention by the international community. The result would be that "some militants may rebel despite the risk of provoking state retaliation, because they expect any resulting atrocities to attract intervention that facilitates their rebellion" (Kuperman 2008:219) . Since transnational human rights groups often call for effective remedies against ongoing atrocities, this argument would blame transnational activists (at least partly) for the very atrocities they seek to end. Ultimately, this claim can be tested empirically by measuring the extent to which domestic groups become more prone to the use of violence and their leaders mention expected external support on a regular basis.
While a smaller group of scholars has investigated why transnational activism provides too little support for certain local causes or fails to even recognize certain conditions as human rights violations, the majority of critics have focused on what goes wrong after a local cause has been taken up by transnational activists. The human rights movement itself has addressed many of these issues already and some of the strategic changes described in the next section reflect how the movement itself has learned from the failures so laboriously described by its academic critics.
Extending Transnational Advocacy beyond the State
Since well before the publication of Activists beyond Borders, transnational human rights activism had evolved beyond the boomerang model. Four key developments are most notable. First, advocacy groups play an increasingly important role in the creation and evolution of international institutions inspiring their activism. Second, transnational human rights groups began in the early 1990s to shift attention away from state governments and explicitly address human rights violations committed by non-state actors (Andreopoulos et al. 2006) . Third, around the same time, humanitarian and development NGOs that were primarily focused on service delivery began to expand their advocacy role (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001) and integrated rights-based approaches into their efforts to promote sustainable development (Uvin 2004) . Finally, a different kind of advocacy focus emerged with the creation of new NGOs (e.g. Global Witness), which sought to move beyond the focus on civil and political rights and claimed to address some of the root causes, such as resource conflicts and ethnic divisions. More traditional transnational NGOs, such as AI, have responded to those changes by undergoing their own transformation (Pack 1999; Hopgood 2006 ).
Transnational Activism and International Institutions
The participation of advocacy networks in the creation and evolution of global human rights institutions has become a major focus of scholarly research (Martens 2005) .
During the 1970s, a coalition of states across ideological divides tried (and failed) to revoke the consultative status of many human rights organizations and inadvertently confirmed the rising power of nongovernmental participation (Shestack 1978:91) . A similar coalition succeeded in moving the UN's human rights institutions from New York to Geneva (Korey 1998:90) . While under attack, the expansion of UN human rights institutions offered also new opportunities for human rights groups (1) to use the proceedings of the UN human rights institutions to submit reports and expose state violations (Rodley 1987; Korey 1998: ch. 11; Treves et al. 2005) ; (2) to further strengthen international human rights institutions (Otto 1996; Gaer 1996; Clark 2001; Khagram et al. 2002; Martens 2006; Joachim 2007) After much internal debate, AI decided in the early 1970s to launch its first single-issue campaign focused on torture and lobby the UN for a separate convention to globally ban the practice. Although the AI Secretariat ultimately rejected the 1984 UN torture convention as ineffective, the organization has been central in establishing strengthened international agreements on core mandate issues, including torture (Cook 1991) , disappearances, and capital punishment. In all of these cases, a "norms cascade" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) signifies the agenda-setting power of AI.
Transnational groups have also played prominent roles in the creation of the UN children's rights convention (Price Cohen 1990) , the adoption of the UN antilandmines treaty (Price 1998) , the establishment of the International Criminal Court (Glasius 2002) , the inclusion of sexual violence in the definition of war crimes (Spees 2003) , the adoption of the Kimberley Agreement to end the sale of conflict diamonds (Wright 2004) , and generally, the growing prominence of human rights concerns within global governance and the UN system (signified in the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1993). Despite the formal limits on the participation of NGOs in intergovernmental institutions (Clark et al. 1998; Willetts 2000; Friedman et al. 2005 These studies argue that states learn how to continue to violate human rights domestically while reaping the benefits of "performing" compliance with the dominant international discourse (Hathaway 2002) . In the human rights area, this gap between domestic practice and international rhetoric is enabled by a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and is most likely to decrease when domestic and transnational activists are able to forge strong transnational ties and regularly call 
Rights-Based Development
A development unforeseen by Keck and Sikkink's Activists beyond Borders is the growing cooperation of advocacy and service-oriented NGOs, primarily across the humanitarian, development, and human rights sectors. This trend is primarily driven by the growth of development-oriented NGOs as well as an increasing realization that a foreign aid program "ought to respect the dignity and individual autonomy of all those it claims to help" (Uvin 2004:138) . Service NGOs also learned that effective development programs required advocacy targeted at the larger economic and social context (Lindenberg and Bryant 2001; Rugendyke 2007) , both in the rich donor countries (e.g. to end agricultural subsidies) and in the developing nations (e.g. to pass legislation supporting microcredit institutions). As aid groups such as Oxfam moved into advocacy, the traditional human rights movement can benefit from the experience of development NGOs, (1) by adopting campaigns on social and economic rights, and (2) by developing explicit "downward" accountability mechanisms which will broaden their legitimacy among constituents and avoid some of the trappings of moral activism (Ignatieff 2001:10) .
More problematic has been the diffusion of human rights ideas into the humanitarian sector. During the 1990s, the success of the human rights idea not provided a rationale for "military interventionism" (Chandler 2001 ), but also contributed to a profound crisis of the humanitarian model. While transnational human rights groups use ethical arguments to discriminate between victim and perpetrator, a core humanitarian value is non-discrimination and the alleviation of suffering based on need only (Leebaw 2007:227) . Humanitarian groups working in 1994 in Rwandan refugee camps faced accusations that their aid "strengthened the power of the very people who had caused the tragedy" (Terry 2002:2) . While Hutus responsible for the genocide abused aid to reorganize in the refugee camps, aid workers with the best of intentions faced impossible ethical choices. The success of the human rights mobilization certainly forced humanitarian groups to think more clearly about their long-term responsibilities, but the "shaming" strategies championed by human rights activists only made things worse and provided little guidance in resolving the crisis on the ground.
Addressing Root Causes of Gross Violations
Targeting non-state actors implicated in gross violations and seeking new alliances with humanitarian and development NGOs reflect efforts by traditional human rights groups to move from a reactive to a preventive human rights strategy. While the idea of "information politics" and "shaming" strategies relies on reporting on violations and atrocities after the fact, the transnational human rights movement has recently shifted attention to (1) addressing root causes of violations, and (2) using Human Rights Education (HRE) as a tool in strengthening popular support for rights.
New types of transnational NGOs targeting root causes of atrocities, including ethnic divisions and competition for resources (e.g. diamonds, timber, oil), include the International Crisis Group (1995) and Global Witness (1998). More traditional human rights NGOs, such as AI, have sought to adopt a more campaign-style approach which looks beyond the individual prisoner (Hopgood 2006) and takes on systemic causes of violations on the national and global levels. For example, AI and HRW have supported for some time stricter controls of arms sales and are behind UN efforts to limit the global circulation of small arms.
Within the more traditional human rights field, the idea of HRE has gained some ground and recognition as a strategy to prevent human rights violations (Mihr and Schmitz 2007) . HRE represents an important effort to overcome the elite-based character of transnational activism and can be used to effectively transmit local needs to international NGOs while translating universal norms for adoption in a local context. Efforts by some aid groups to promote a rights-based approach to development opens an important door to transnational human rights groups which usually lack a strong local presence in the developing world.
Next Frontier: Internal Dynamics of Transnational Advocacy
The modern story of human rights is not as straightforward as the early proponents of transnational advocacy networks suggested. Transnational human rights networks undoubtedly represent a new and powerful force in international politics, but their activism has complex and often unintended results. An organization such as AI has defined what constitutes a human rights violation for a generation, but has failed to 23 nurture a global human rights culture that would eliminate the need for its activism.
Ten years after the publication of Activists beyond Borders, conclusive evidence for success in the core mandate of narrowing the gap between states' international commitments and domestic practices remains elusive and contested. Defenders of the rights revolution may argue that it will take more time to complete a nonviolent, incremental socialization process driven by international institutions and transnational networks. But its critics can point to contemporary atrocities, a lack of progress in states' compliance with human rights standards, and a profound crisis of the model of moral activism for universal principles.
Critics of the global human rights movement either reject the idea of human rights as such or take a more reformist view by focusing on the tactical and strategic challenges of transnational activism. Among the latter group, a significant number of scholars charges that transnational human rights activism is failing because it is increasingly driven by material interests of organizational survival, not principles.
While the promotion of norms sometimes conflicts with interests, moving beyond this artificial dichotomy represents the next frontier in the study of advocacy networks.
The main challenge for human rights activism is not that their principles are compromised by self-interest, but that their core information-based strategies are reactive only and that they frequently face profound ethical dilemmas, for example in estimating the harm inflicted by a military intervention to end atrocities. The "boomerang" model only works in circumstances where states have the basic capacity to protect human rights. Activists have to develop strategies which are more responsive to local demands, shift attention to the prevention of gross violations, and move beyond "shaming" toward strengthening state capacity in the protection of human rights.
Advancing the study of transnational human rights networks as well as other types of non-state actors requires a move beyond the principles/interests dichotomy and entails an inquiry into the internal dynamics of participant NGOs. Leaders, boards, staff, and sometimes a membership continuously interpret and shape the mandate as well as the interests of the organization. With a few exceptions (Korey 1998: ch. 14; Watson 2004) , such internal processes are largely absent from studies on transnational activism. Only very few researchers get extended access to staff and internal meetings (Hopgood 2006) . Studies on the "domestic politics" of transnational 24 activism are rare because the majority of smaller or mid-sized NGOs typically lack resources to maintain archives and may view the presence of researchers as a distraction with little benefit to their mission.
While scholars have established a new field studying transnational activism, many central organizations and their internal development are rarely explored. AI is a leading organization in the field of human rights but "we know next to nothing about what Amnesty is like on the inside" (Hopgood 2006:3) . Ethnographic studies of individual organizations move academic debates forward because they question fundamental assumptions about the principled or rational character of transnational mobilizing and claim that organizations such as AI are not NGOs, but a form of secular church requiring sacrifice and self-denial from its staff and membership (Hopgood 2006:18-20) . Such studies tell readers how AI has attempted to move away from the outdated old letter-writing model towards a more campaign-style approach, despite the danger that such a choice "drains away moral authority precisely as it increases political authority" (2006:220). These studies tell an inside story that scholars need to know if they ever want to fully explain how activists convince the public that "a given state of affairs is neither natural nor accidental" (Keck and Sikkink 1998:14) .
Beyond detailed, ethnographic studies of prominent NGOs, the field needs more studies comparing advocacy organizations within the human rights sector as well as across other sectors of transnational activism, including conflict resolution, humanitarian relief, sustainable development, and environmental protection. The growing cooperation across these sectors described earlier raises important questions about the role of the size, location, and other internal features of transnational organizations. Significant variation in size and income suggests that a organization like HRW will have much less in common with a smaller NGO within the human rights sector, while sharing many similarities of organizational behavior with large transnational NGOs such as Worldvision or Conservation International. More research strategies should put transnational human rights organizations in a larger context of advocacy groups and explore similarities and differences with other NGOs as well as for-profit organizations.
